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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 12-1353 
__________ 
 
SATHEESKANNAN SENTHINATHAN, 
                                                        Petitioner 
  
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
         Respondent 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A079-784-809) 
Board of Immigration Appeals Judge: Hon. Roger Pauley 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 12, 2013 
 
Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and STARK,

 District Judge. 
 
(Filed: February 28, 2013) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
          
 
 
 
STARK, District Judge. 
                                              
 
Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Judge of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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 Satheeskannan Senthinathan (“Petitioner”) petitions for review of an order from 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s 
(“IJ”) decision denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider or reopen a final order of 
removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
I 
 As we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the record, we limit 
our discussion of the background to only what is necessary for our resolution of the 
issues on appeal. 
 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Sri Lanka.  His ethnicity is Tamil.  Petitioner 
contends that in Sri Lanka he was repeatedly arrested, beaten, and tortured by the Sri 
Lankan Army, who believed Petitioner to be a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (“LTTE”).1  In January 2001, Petitioner left Sri Lanka.  On October 28, 2001, 
Petitioner attempted to enter the United States in San Ysidro, California using false 
identification.  Petitioner was denied admission and detained. 
 On November 5, 2001, the government initiated removal proceedings at the 
Immigration Court in San Diego.  Petitioner conceded his removability but sought relief 
in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 
Torture.  On August 8, 2003, the San Diego Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s 
request for relief and ordered him removed to Sri Lanka.  The BIA affirmed on January 2, 
2004. 
 On January 18, 2007, the BIA sua sponte vacated its January 2, 2004 decision and 
remanded the case back to the San Diego Immigration Court.  On April 2, 2007, 
                                              
 1
The U.S. Department of State has designated the LTTE as a terrorist organization 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189.  
3 
 
Petitioner filed a motion to change venue from San Diego to Philadelphia, which was 
granted on May 2, 2007. 
 On September 9, 2008, a Philadelphia Immigration Court Judge found that 
Petitioner was statutorily ineligible for asylum because he provided “material support” to 
a designated terrorist organization, the LTTE.  Petitioner did not appeal this finding to the 
BIA.  Instead, on October 8, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion with the Immigration Court, 
asking the IJ for reconsideration and/or to reopen.  On January 7, 2009, the IJ denied the 
motion.  On January 13, 2012, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.  Petitioner timely filed 
this petition for review. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Where the BIA expressly 
adopts the IJ’s decision, as is the case here, we review the decisions of both the IJ and the 
BIA.  See Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Petitioner appeals the denial of his motion to reopen and his motion to reconsider.  
A motion to reopen is based on factual grounds and seeks to present new facts or 
evidence that may entitle the alien to relief from deportation.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.23(b)(3).  A motion to reconsider is based on legal grounds and challenges 
allegedly erroneous determinations of law and fact.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2).  We 
review a denial of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion.  
See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992); Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 
(3d Cir. 2006).  The BIA’s denial of such motions is entitled to broad deference and 
generally will not be reversed unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Filja, 
447 F.3d at 251.  We review the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact 
for substantial evidence.  Id. 
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 Motions that ask to reopen a case sua sponte are committed to the discretion of the 
BIA or the IJ and are not subject to judicial review unless based on an “incorrect legal 
premise.”  See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III 
 The government contends that we have no jurisdiction to review the Immigration 
Court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to reopen because that motion sought sua sponte 
relief and the Immigration Court’s decision was not based on an “incorrect legal 
premise.”  Although the title of Petitioner’s motion refers to the IJ’s “sua sponte 
authority” (JA88), neither the IJ nor the BIA regarded his motion as seeking sua sponte 
relief.  To the contrary, the IJ acknowledged that the “motion meets the time and number 
limits for motions to reopen” and agreed to consider the motion on the merits.  (JA71)  
We, too, will treat Petitioner’s motion as a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.23(b)(3). 
 Having found jurisdiction, we conclude that the IJ’s decision to deny Petitioner’s 
motion to reopen is supported by substantial evidence.  “A motion to reopen will not be 
granted unless the Immigration Judge is satisfied that evidence sought to be offered is 
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the 
former hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3); see also Doherty, 502 U.S. at 326.  The IJ 
found that Petitioner failed to meet this standard because much of the evidence Petitioner 
presented “was previously available or discoverable.”  (JA71)  The remaining evidence – 
two news articles – was deemed immaterial as it addressed a different asylum case, 
involving a different alien and a different Court.  We find no error in these 
determinations. 
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IV 
 Petitioner contends that several legal and factual errors required his motion for 
reconsideration to be granted.  We disagree, for reasons explained below. 
A 
 Petitioner argues that, as a result of the proceedings in the San Diego Immigration 
Court, the Philadelphia Immigration Court was collaterally estopped from addressing 
whether Petitioner provided “material support” to a terrorist organization.  Collateral 
estoppel requires, among other things, that the issue at stake be identical in both 
proceedings.  See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979).  The San Diego 
Judge found that Petitioner lacked credibility and was therefore ineligible for asylum and 
withholding of removal.  Hence, whether Petitioner, in addition to being ineligible for 
credibility reasons, was also barred from receiving the requested relief because he 
provided material support to a terrorist organization was never an “issue at stake” in the 
San Diego Court. 
 Moreover, when the BIA sua sponte remanded Petitioner’s case back to the San 
Diego Court in 2007, it vacated that Court’s August 8, 2003 decision.  For this reason as 
well, the San Diego Court’s 2003 decision cannot be the basis of a collateral estoppel 
claim.  See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n., Inc., 641 F.2d 90, 93-94 
(3d Cir. 1981). 
B 
 Petitioner asserts that the Philadelphia IJ’s ruling on the issue of material support 
violated his right to due process.  But that ruling was based on the record produced over 
the course of proceedings in which Petitioner was represented by an attorney.  
Petitioner’s purported ties to the LTTE were implicated throughout the proceedings, 
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including when the government presented a witness (Agent Schultz) for the purpose of 
establishing those ties.  Petitioner had an opportunity to cross-examine Agent Schultz and 
to present rebuttal evidence.  The record was reopened following remand to the 
Philadelphia Immigration Court, providing Petitioner with yet another opportunity to 
supplement the record.  Following the close of the proceedings in Philadelphia, the IJ 
made an individualized determination of Petitioner’s interests.  Petitioner’s right to due 
process was not violated.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001). 
C 
 Petitioner contends that the factual record does not support a finding that he 
provided “material support” to a terrorist organization.  We will affirm the material 
support finding because no “evidence compels a contrary conclusion.”  Ahmed v. 
Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 2003).  The smugglers expressly instructed 
Petitioner not to reveal details of his trip or their identities.  Petitioner perjured himself to 
protect this information, recanting his testimony only after the government proved it 
false.  Moreover, the IJ found that “given the totality of the control that LTTE exerts over 
its territory in Sri Lanka . . . [Petitioner] reasonably should have known of this 
connection.”  (JA405)  Petitioner’s decision to participate in the smuggling scheme 
caused money to be transferred to a terrorist organization by his family. 
D 
 The BIA’s January 18, 2007 order instructed that “a new decision shall be entered 
which includes a new credibility finding applying Suntharalinkam v. Gonzales, [458 F.3d 
1034 (9th Cir. 2006),] and other relevant Ninth Circuit law.”  (JA978-79)  In that order, 
the BIA remanded the case back to the San Diego Immigration Court.  Subsequently, 
Petitioner successfully moved to transfer venue to Philadelphia.  The Philadelphia IJ 
7 
 
appropriately applied Third Circuit law, as an IJ is not bound by a decision of a court of 
appeals in a different circuit.  See Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223, 235 (BIA 2002). 
E 
 Finally, Petitioner contends that the IJ abused his discretion by failing to consider 
certain factors as part of the asylum analysis.  However, under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2), an 
alien is barred from receiving asylum if he has been found to have materially supported 
terrorism.  Because Petitioner is statutorily barred from receiving asylum, the IJ could not 
reach the discretionary portion of the asylum analysis. 
V 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the BIA’s judgment. 
